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Abstract. In determining whether to admit improperly obtained real evidence,
the Scottish courts have engaged in a balancing act for over 50 years, weighing
the public interest in the conviction of the guilty against the rights of the
accused and the civil liberties of the citizenry. The Appeal Court’s approach to
this issue has not been particularly satisfactory and the result is an incoherent
mass of detailed and often almost irreconcilable case law, rather than a
principled framework to guide the trial courts in the exercise of this power.
he admissibility of improperly acquired real evidence is a difficult issue
in most jurisdictions. Solutions have ranged from almost always
admitting such evidence—the historical position in England—to almost
always excluding it—the approach in the United States throughout the latter half
of last century. More recently, most jurisdictions have attempted to find something
of a compromise between these two positions. This latter approach was adopted
in Scotland in the middle of last century as a result of the leading case of Lawrie
v Muir where, paraphrasing roughly, Lord Cooper stated that the court must
determine whether such evidence should be admitted depending on the balance
between the need to preserve civil liberties and the need to ensure that justice is
done.1 Until then in Scotland, real evidence which had been obtained irregularly
was always in practice admitted.2 At the time, Lawrie was perceived to be something
of a pioneering decision, both in Scotland and elsewhere. For instance, in 1955
Glanville Williams, after reviewing the competing English and American
positions, concluded:
As a compromise between the opposing considerations of policy the
Scottish doctrine has, it is submitted, much to commend it.3
1 1950 JC 19 at 26.
2 M. Ross, Walker and Walker: The Law of Evidence in Scotland (T & T Clark: Edinburgh, 2000) 7.
3 G. Williams, ‘Evidence Obtained by Illegal Means’ [1955] Crim LR 339 at 349.
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Similarly, Cross, in the first edition of Evidence, quoted at length from Lawrie,
observing with a note of regret that there had been no such examination of the
relevant principles in England, despite the fact that these were of ‘the highest
significance’.4 He observed with approval that ‘recent Scots decisions have gone
far towards providing a compromise between the two conflicting interests by
according a large measure of discretion to the trial judge’, noting some pages
later that ‘the difference from English law is striking’.5 More recently, Yeo granted
‘full honours’ to the Scottish courts for their approach,6 and Dennis approvingly
notes that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 brought England into line
with the Scottish position.7 Mirfield observes that Lawrie has been ‘of great
influence’ in England and other common law jurisdictions and has been followed
in Australia.8 This approval has extended to the judiciary also, Lord Scarman, for
instance, in Sang, stating that in formulating his views, he was ‘encouraged’ by
the fact that Scots law recognised the ‘discretionary principle of fairness to the
accused’ (the latter phrase he quoted from Lord Cooper’s words in Lawrie).9
The purpose of this article is to trace the history of this judicial capacity to exclude
improperly obtained real evidence since its introduction, through the decision
in Lawrie, to the law of Scotland. I shall show that, unfortunately, for a number of
reasons, no clear framework has evolved to guide judges in this task. First, the
various, traditional rationales for excluding improperly obtained evidence have
all frequently been cited: the ‘reliability principle’ (i.e. ensuring the reliability of
the evidence); the ‘disciplinary principle’ (i.e. controlling the police and
prosecution authorities); the ‘vindicatory principle’ (i.e. protecting or vindicating
the rights of the accused).10 As is the situation elsewhere, it is not clear which of
these rationales motivates the decisions of the Scottish courts and this has led to
inconsistencies in the application of the law. As we shall see, in one case the
court will cite one of these three principles, leading to a particular result, and in
another similar case the court will cite another, leading to a different result.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the Scottish courts would be best advised to adopt
the ‘moral legitimacy principle’ (the need to maintain the legitimacy of the verdict
and legal system), identified by recent theorists,11 although, again, this does not
satisfactorily explain or justify all the Scottish decisions.12
4 R. Cross, Evidence (Butterworths: London, 1958) 259, 268.
5 Ibid. at 268. C. Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 9th edn (Butterworths: London, 1999) 494–5
still introduces the topic of improperly obtained evidence with Lord Cooper’s dicta from Lawrie.
6 M. Yeo, ‘Inclusionary Discretion over Unfairly Obtained Evidence’ (1982) 31 ICLQ 392.
7 I. Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 2nd edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2002) 76.
8 P. Mirfield, Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence (OUP: Oxford, 1997) 339, 354.
9 R v Sang [1980] AC 402 at 457.
10 See Dennis, above n. 7 at ch. 8; and Tapper, above n. 5 at 495–509.
11 Ibid.
12 P. Duff, ‘Admissibility of Improperly Obtained Evidence in the Scottish Criminal Trial: The Search
for Principle’ 2004 ELR (forthcoming).
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Secondly, and to some degree related to the first reason, there is some confusion
as to what factors are relevant in determining whether evidence should be
admitted and the weight to be attributed to these. Among the issues which have
been taken into account by the Scottish courts are: the gravity of the crime; the
extent of the irregularity; the urgency of the investigation; the need to preserve
evidence; the authority and identity of those who obtained the evidence; the
motive of those responsible for the impropriety; the extent of the infringement
of the accused’s rights; and the issue of fairness to the accused.13 The judiciary
has tended to ‘pick and mix’ from this list, sometimes being heavily influenced
by a particular factor and, on other occasions, dismissing the same factor as of
no account. This has led to considerable inconsistency and uncertainty in the
law. Thirdly, the courts have often seemed reluctant to use their broad, but rather
vague, power under the Lawrie formula to determine whether evidence should be
admitted, seemingly preferring to seek refuge in the apparent certainties of
technical and procedural issues, a device which runs counter to the spirit of Lord
Cooper’s famous dicta. Sometimes, this has led to almost nonsensical results as
will be demonstrated below by the case of Singh.14
A final factor, and one which is often overlooked by those who have admired the
Scottish approach, is that the trial judge has no ‘discretion’, in the true sense of
the word, whether to admit improperly obtained evidence.15 The decision is
dictated purely by the law and, ultimately, the Appeal Court will determine
whether the trial judge got it right or wrong in legal terms, either in admitting
the evidence or, very occasionally, in excluding it where there has been a
prosecution appeal on a point of law.16 This is unlike the position which has
developed in England under s. 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(PACE) where the trial judge truly does have a discretion whether to admit
improperly obtained evidence. The exercise of this discretion can only be reviewed
on Wednesbury principles; thus, as Dennis explains: ‘The Court of Appeal will not
substitute its own judgment for that of the trial judge simply because it takes a
different view of the case.’17 In other words, the trial judge must be shown to
have erred in principle or reached a wholly unreasonable decision before the
Court of Appeal will interfere.
13 See Ross, above n. 2 at 7.
14 Singh and Singh v HMA 2001 SCCR 348.
15 J. Gray, ‘The Admissibility of Evidence Illegally Obtained in Scotland’ 1966 JR 89 at 104, made
this point quite some time ago, but it is equally true today.
16 Such appeals are rare and have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case. One such case,
Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 of 2002 2002 SCCR 743, is discussed below.
17 Dennis, above n. 7 at 263.
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In Scotland, on the other hand, although the matter has never been expressly
considered by the courts,18 the Appeal Court generally does not seem to take the
view that the trial judge makes a discretionary decision which should not be
interfered with unless the decision was wholly unreasonable. On the contrary, it
seems to be only too willing to attempt to ‘fine-tune’ the decisions on admissibility
reached in the courts below and thus the trial judge cannot be said to have any
real discretion on the matter at all. He or she is generally perceived to be making
a legal decision which is always liable to be overruled by the Appeal Court, often
on very narrow grounds. Certainly, the Scottish Law Commission recently took
the view that the Scottish judiciary probably does not have a ‘discretion’ to
determine the admissibility of criminal evidence in any significant area.19 This, I
think, has been unfortunate because, oddly enough, it has probably exacerbated
the uncertainty in the law inevitably caused by Lord Cooper’s balancing act.20
First, if a trial judge comes to a decision over which reasonable people (or judges)
could disagree, then in Scotland the matter is still open and an appeal court may
or may not ratify the original decision. Secondly, and consequently, the Appeal
Court has tended to consider the minutiae of each and every case and draw very
narrow distinctions in reaching its decisions, rather than setting out a principled
and coherent framework to guide trial judges in the exercise of their capacity to
determine whether evidence is admissible. This has not helped the law develop
in a clear and consistent fashion.
The original triptych of cases
While Lawrie v Muir21 was clearly the landmark case, it is significant that two
other leading Scottish cases on this issue were decided within mere months of
that decision: McGovern v HMA22 and Fairley v The Wardens and Commonalty of the
Fishmongers of the City of London and Another.23 All three were decided by the High
Court of Justiciary sitting in appeal mode (henceforth the ‘Appeal Court’), the
highest criminal court in matters of Scottish criminal law and procedure. Lawrie
itself was decided by a ‘Full Bench’, an appeal court comprising more than the
normal three judges which is convened either to overrule a previous decision or
18 There is only one case where this issue seems to have been expressly raised. In Lord Advocate’s
Reference No. 1 of 2002 2002 SCCR 743, the judgment indicates that there was a suggestion from
the defence that it is only where the trial judge has exercised his discretion unreasonably that
the Appeal Court should step in (at para. 12). The point did not need to be decided and was not
referred to again in the judgment.
19 Scottish Law Commission, Evidence: Report on Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, Report No.
149 (HMSO: Edinburgh, 1995) para. 4.37.
20 The Scottish Law Commission (ibid. at para. 4.35) was persuaded by the more obvious argument
that inconsistency and lack of clarity are caused by the existence of a discretion, not by its lack.
21 1950 JC 19.
22 1950 JC 33.
23 1951 JC 14.
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where the matter raised is particularly novel and weighty. In all three cases, the
court’s judgment was given by Lord Justice General Cooper, to grant him his full
title as the most senior member of the Scottish judiciary, who is generally regarded
as the most influential judge of the 20th century in terms of the development of
Scots law, both civil and criminal.24 It is worth noting that Lord Carmont was
also on the bench on all three cases but he restricted himself simply to concurring
with the Lord Justice General. At the outset, it is useful to examine these three
cases in some detail because such an analysis provides a foretaste of the
inconsistencies and problems which were to come.
Lawrie
This case arose out of the prosecution of the owner of a dairy for selling milk in
bottles belonging to others and, ironically in the light of its subsequent
importance, Lord Cooper thought it ‘singularly unsuitable as a test case’ because
of its extreme triviality.25 The offence had come to light as a result of two inspectors
from the Scottish Milk Marketing Board searching the appellant’s shop. In doing
so, they had unwittingly exceeded their powers but the Sheriff admitted their
evidence because he was satisfied that they had acted in good faith and did not
consider that their lack of authority ‘justified the exclusion of the evidence’. As
a result of the lack of direct authority on the point, the initial hearing in the
Appeal Court referred the matter to a full bench of seven judges which took a
contrary view from the Sheriff. Here, Lord Cooper famously summarised the
dilemma facing the court:
from the standpoint of principle … the law must strive to reconcile
two highly important interests which are liable to come into conflict—
(a) the interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular
invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of
the State to secure that evidence bearing upon the commission of
crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not be withheld
from Courts of law on any merely formal or technical ground.26
As regards the former interest, the Lord Justice General emphasised the protection
of the citizen against ‘unwarranted, wrongful and perhaps high-handed
interference’,27 although he did note that ‘the common sanction’ is one of
24 In civil matters, the Lord Justice General is known as the Lord President (and the High Court of
Justiciary becomes the Court of Session, although the composition of the two courts is identical).
For praise of Lord Cooper, see T. B. Smith, ‘The Contribution of Lord Cooper of Culross to Scottish
Law’ 1955 JR 249.
25 1950 JC 19 at 28.
26 Ibid. at 26.
27 Ibid.
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damages. As well as these references to what looks very like a vindicatory rationale,
he also referred to the dangers of ‘offering a positive inducement to the authorities
to proceed by irregular methods’ which looks like a disciplinary rationale.
Balancing these factors against the interest of the state in ensuring that justice is
done, he concluded that the rule in Scots law was that an irregularity in the
collection of evidence did not necessarily render the evidence inadmissible28 but
it did need to be ‘excused’ before the evidence could be admitted. Whether an
irregularity could be excused depended upon its nature, the circumstances and
‘in particular, the discretionary principle of fairness to the accused’ which, Lord
Cooper noted, had been ‘developed so fully’ as regards the admission of confession
evidence. In his view, the fairness to the accused would clearly be relevant where
the irregularity amounted to an ‘unfair trick’ by the police (a disciplinary
rationale?) or was in relation to the many statutory offences where a special
procedure had been prescribed for obtaining evidence (a protective or vindicatory
rationale?). In the present case, which fell into this latter category, the irregularity
could not be excused and thus the evidence of the inspectors should have been
excluded.
McGovern
Unfortunately, the lack of clarity of the framework for determining whether
improperly obtained evidence should be admitted became apparent in McGovern,
which was heard by the Appeal Court a mere two months later. In this case,
scrapings were taken from the accused’s nails at the police station just before he
was arrested and charged with safe-blowing, and subsequent chemical analysis
of the sample confirmed the presence of explosives. He appealed against
conviction on the basis that the evidence relating to the scrapings from his
fingernails had been improperly obtained and should not have been admitted.
The Crown claimed that the irregularity was very minor—if the sample had been
taken after his arrest a few minutes later, it would have been properly obtained—
and thus, under Lawrie, the impropriety should be excused and the evidence
admitted. The Appeal Court rejected this argument and quashed the conviction
but its reasoning is not particularly satisfactory.
In a very short opinion—it is less than one page and comprises only four
paragraphs—with which the other judges simply concurred, Lord Cooper, having
alluded to the recent decision in Lawrie, observed:
Where evidence has been wrongly admitted and is of such a nature
28 In reaching this conclusion, he adopted dicta from HMA v Mcguigan 1936 JC 16, where the trial
judge, Lord Justice Clerk Aitchison, had appeared to accept that a particularly egregious
impropriety might render evidence inadmissible.
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as to prejudice the fair trial of the applicant, it cannot easily be said
that there has been no miscarriage of justice.29
One could hardly disagree with this sentiment but it rather begs the question
because, first, Lord Cooper seems simply to assume that the evidence had been
wrongly admitted. Surely the precise point at issue before the Appeal Court was
to establish whether this was indeed so, or, alternatively, whether the evidence
was correctly admitted because the irregularity could be excused. Further, he
surely could not conclude that the evidence was ‘prejudicial’, in that it
unjustifiably influenced the decision, without further explanation. Certainly, it
was incriminative but in this instance, where there was no question of its
reliability, it would surely only be ‘prejudicial’ if it was unfairly admitted, which
is what the court was supposed to be deciding.30 Again, Lord Cooper appeared to
pre-judge the issue which the court was supposed to determine.
In any event, Lord Cooper was not ‘disposed’ to excuse the conduct of the police
because it was not difficult or impractical for them to follow the proper procedure
and, thus, he concluded ‘with some regret, for the matter was never properly
raised in the Court below’ that there was no option but to quash the conviction.
Again, quite what ‘matter’ was not properly discussed in the trial court is not
clear, although I suspect he was referring to the fact that it was not known why
the police departed from normal procedure. Thus, the High Court’s ‘regret’ at
having to quash the conviction may have stemmed from the failure of the
prosecution to advance a good reason for ‘excusing’ the impropriety. As we shall
see, this type of scenario certainly occurred in several later cases. Finally, it is
worth noting that Lord Cooper’s initial comments about the ‘prejudice’ caused
to the accused by the use of the evidence at trial suggest he was influenced by
the need to protect the accused’s rights because there was no question over its
reliability. Thus, this comment seems to be founded in a vindicatory rationale
but Lord Cooper concluded his opinion, with what appears to be a reference to a
disciplinary rationale, by stating that the appeal had to be upheld because:
unless the principles under which police investigations are carried
out are adhered to with reasonable strictness, the anchor of the entire
system for the protection of the public will very soon begin to drag.31
29 1950 JC 33 at 135.
30 I have commented elsewhere, above n. 12, on the tendency of the Scottish judiciary to merge the
words ‘prejudicial’ or ‘unfair’ and ‘incriminative’ in this context. See also Singh and Singh v HMA
2001 SCCR 348 but cf. Webley v Ritchie 1997 SLT 1241.
31 1951 JC 14 at 135.
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Fairley
One can contrast Lord Cooper’s views in McGovern and Lawrie with those expressed
a few months later by a sheriff and by Lord Cooper himself in the Appeal Court in
the case of Fairley. What is odd about this case is that, while reference is made to
Lawrie, there is no mention of McGovern whatsoever.32 The facts in Fairley were
remarkably similar to Lawrie, in that Fairley also involved two inspectors, in this
instance employed respectively by the respondents and by the Ministry of Food,
who exceeded their statutory powers, entirely inadvertently, in securing evidence
from a cold store, namely salmon, which had been caught out of season. The
Sheriff in Fairley distinguished Lawrie, on the fairly narrow ground of a difference
between the precise status of inspectors in each case, and went on to state:
What they did was to obtain by irregular means evidence which could
easily have been obtained regularly. In my opinion, the appellant
suffered no real prejudice, and I did not see that the mistakes which
were made could be said to have operated against the appellant so
unfairly as to withdraw the evidence from the court.33
Thus, unlike Lord Cooper in McGovern, the Sheriff was very clear that the mere
fact that the evidence had been improperly obtained and was highly incriminative
did not automatically mean that the accused’s position was prejudiced and that
he could not get a fair trial. In other words, he did not treat the words
‘incriminative’ and ‘prejudicial’ as synonymous.
On appeal, Lord Cooper accepted that the way in which the evidence was obtained
was not ‘strictly in accordance with any statutory or other authority’ but
emphasised that the inspectors had acted in good faith. Further, he took the view
that ‘the appellant’s assumption of the guise of a champion of the liberties of the
subject failed to elicit my sympathies’.34 Consequently, Lord Cooper agreed with
the Sheriff that the irregularity ought to be excused and the evidence admitted,
the other two judges simply concurring with his opinion. Unlike the Sheriff, Lord
Cooper gave no explanation as to how he distinguished this case from Lawrie,
apart from the fact that the accused, a hotel owner, failed to attract his sympathy.
Both cases involved an inadvertent breach of statutory regulations—in the instant
case, of the Salmon Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1868—by non-police enforcement
32 Lord Cooper possibly forgot about his decision in McGovern because nearly nine months had
elapsed since he had made it at the end of January,  although this seems unlikely. However,
defence counsel should surely have cited it because the report was published in the Scots Law
Times fairly soon after the decision (1950 SLT 113) and well before Fairley was heard in the Sheriff
Court in July and the High Court in October.
33 1951 JC 14 at 19.
34 Ibid. at 24.
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agencies acting in good faith, yet in one case the evidence was admissible and in
the other it was not. The decision to admit the evidence in Fairley is particularly
odd when one remembers Lord Cooper’s remarks in Lawrie about the particular
need to safeguard the interest of fairness where special procedures are set up for
particular statutory offences.
It is also difficult to reconcile the decision in Fairley with that in McGovern. If the
owner of a hotel in possession of salmon caught out of season was not a suitable
recipient of Lord Cooper’s ‘sympathies’ as ‘a champion’ of the citizenry’s rights,
it is difficult to see why a professional safe-cracker was. Further, one would have
thought the public interest in securing the conviction of the accused was much
more likely to outweigh the need to protect his civil liberties in the case of McGovern
than Fairley: a safe-blower is surely a greater public menace than a hotelier who
serves out-of-season salmon! It is also odd that, in McGovern, Lord Cooper was not
prepared to excuse the conduct of the police on the ground that it would have
been very easy for them to follow the correct procedure whereas, in Fairley, the
main reason for admitting the evidence given by the Sheriff, and this point was
also emphasised by Lord Cooper, was that it would have been very easy for the
inspectors to get the appropriate warrant. Thus, this factor was used to support
the argument to exclude the evidence in McGovern but was used, a few months
later, to support the argument to admit it in Fairley, on both occasions by Lords
Cooper and Carmont.
Contemporary Scottish comment
In the wake of these cases, it is hardly surprising that, despite the praise for the
Scottish position from south of the border, Scottish commentators on these
developments argued that this bold attempt to steer something of a middle course
between the automatic exclusion or inclusion of improperly obtained evidence
was not entirely satisfactory.35 Writing in the mid 1960s, Gray observed that the
reference to the ‘sympathies’ of the court in Fairley was a ‘clear indication of the
subjective nature of (the Appeal Court’s) approach’.36 In his view, this had
inevitably led to an ‘ad hoc’ approach to the cases and he argued, with considerable
justification, that this has led to ‘uncertainty’ and ‘confusion’ in the law.37
35 English readers must bear in mind that there has traditionally been very little written on the
law of evidence in Scotland. However, almost 20 years after the decision in Lawrie, two major
articles on this topic did appear: J. Gray, ‘The Admissibility of Evidence Illegally Obtained in
Scotland’ 1966 JR 89; and JTC, ‘Evidence Obtained by Means Considered Irregular’ 1969 JR 55
(the use of initials indicates the latter author was probably an advocate).
36 Gray, above n. 35 at 99.
37 Ibid. at 100.
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As well as analysing in detail the difficulties involved in reconciling the original
three cases discussed above,38 Gray further illustrated his argument with a detailed
comparison of the two subsequent authorities in this area, both decisions by the
same trial judge (Lord Guthrie) in the High Court, although seven years apart.39
Very briefly, in both Turnbull40 and Hepper,41 the police were searching premises
with full authority in connection with one suspected crime and, coming across
evidence of other possible crimes, removed this as well. In Turnbull, the latter
evidence was held to be inadmissible while in Hepper, it was held to be admissible.
Gray questioned Lord Guthrie’s view that there was any valid distinction between
the two cases. He then concluded his article by arguing that as a result of the
‘extreme uncertainty … and needless complexity of the Scottish “doctrine”, so
called … ’42 as regards improperly obtained real evidence, it would be better to
adopt either the inclusionary rule of England (at the time) or the exclusionary
approach of the United States, although he preferred the former principle.43
Similarly, in 1969, JTC penned a critique of both the English and Scottish approach
to irregularly obtained evidence.44 His main aims were to show, first, that recent
utterances in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council about the similarities
in the Scottish and English positions were misfounded and, secondly, that it made
no sense to base the law on a ‘reliability principle’, as he argued the English
courts were doing.45 While more critical of the English position, JTC was clearly
not happy with the approach taken by the Scottish courts, which he thought
incorporated a disciplinary rationale as well, resulting, in his view, in ‘greater
subjectivity’, ‘vagueness’ and ‘emotionalism’. This had led to a failure to develop
‘tests of sufficient objectivity’ to provide coherence in the law and had resulted
in ‘inconsistency’.46 In JTC’s view, if the courts focused their view solely on the
impact of an irregularity on an innocent suspect (thus adopting something akin
to a vindicatory rationale), this would provide the necessary objective principle
and certainty in the law. Thus, the only two Scottish commentators around the
time were agreed that the application of Lord Cooper’s dicta had led to uncertainty
38 Ibid. at 97–105.
39 Ibid. at 105–11. The only other case in this entire period which raised the same issue was HMA v
McKay 1960 JC 47 where Lord Wheatley held that even if the search was irregular, which he did
not accept, he would admit the evidence under the principle expressed in Lawrie.
40 Turnbull v HMA 1951 SLT 409.
41 Hepper v HMA 1958 JC 39.
42 Gray, above n. 35 at 112.
43 See Burke v Wilson 1988 SCCR 363 for a further and more recent example of this type of judicial
hair-splitting. The court thought the circumstances were more similar to Hepper, thus the search
was deemed regular and the evidence admissible.
44 JTC, above n. 35.
45 His discussion centred around Deokinanan v The Queen [1968] 3 WLR 38 and King v The Queen [1968]
3 WLR 391.
46 JTC, above n. 35 at 76.
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and inconsistency in the law but disagreed about the solution, Gray advocating
an abandonment of the attempt to steer a middle course between automatic
inclusion or exclusion and JTC favouring the adoption of a firm principle to act
as a compass and guide the courts in the exercise of their power.
A reluctance to excuse irregularities?
As will be seen, the concerns of the above commentators about potential
uncertainty in the law and inconsistency of decision making have been amply
borne out over the last 40 years. However, what is surprising, I think, is the lack
of cases where the courts have held, on the application of the Lawrie test, that
they are prepared to excuse an irregularity and admit the relevant evidence,
whereas there are many cases where such attempts have failed. A cautionary note
must be sounded here because it is impossible to ascertain what actually happens
at the trial court level. There might be a large number of cases where a High
Court judge or sheriff has determined that evidence was obtained improperly
but was prepared to excuse the irregularity. I suspect this is unlikely because,
first, such decisions are likely to be appealed and thus reported and, secondly,
their intrinsically problematic nature, whether there is an appeal or not, will
lead to their appearance among reported cases. Following Fairley, the next case
where an irregularity was excused, Walsh v MacPhail,47 did not arise until nearly
30 years later in 1978, and its circumstances were described by the Sheriff before
whom the trial took place as ‘very unusual’.48
In Walsh, the accused was a US airman stationed at an RAF base where it was
suspected drugs were present. A sniffer dog was brought in and, as a result, a
warrant was issued by a senior US officer to authorise a search of the accused’s
quarters. Drugs were discovered but it transpired that the warrant was not valid
according to American military law. The defence objected to the admission of
the drugs as evidence but the Sheriff repelled that objection because by the time
a Scottish warrant had been obtained, there would have been ample opportunity
for the accused to have disposed of the evidence. The Appeal Court seemed to
agree that the urgency of the situation justified excusing the irregularity and, in
addition, particularly emphasised, following Fairley, that the military authorities
were acting in good faith in that they thought the warrant was valid.
Almost a decade after that came the case of McNeill where the charges related to
the importation of large quantities of cannabis.49 The trial judge, Lord Hunter,
47 1978 SLT (Notes of Recent Decisions) 29.
48 Ibid. at 30.
49 McNeill and Others v HMA 1986 SCCR 280.
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was not persuaded that a particular piece of evidence had been irregularly seized
but expressed an opinion that even if the search had been irregular, he would
have been prepared to admit the evidence because ‘the interests of the public in
the due administration of justice’ outweighed ‘the rights of the . . . [accused] . . .
as an individual’.50 The Appeal Court opted to ‘assume, without deciding, that
these articles . . . were irregularly obtained’ and went on to express the view that
the ‘sheer urgency of the situation excuses any irregularity there may have been’.
In its opinion, in the context of the importance of the investigation and the serious
nature of the charges, ‘the interests of the public in the due administration of
justice heavily outweighed those of the appellant . . . as an individual’.51 Without
expanding upon this in any way, it thus upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit
the evidence.
In the mid 1990s, there came three further cases where irregularly obtained
evidence was admitted under the Lawrie formula and it is perhaps significant
that there was considerable overlapping of the individual judges across them.52
These were Namyslak v HMA,53 Webley v Ritchie54 and Hepburn v Brown.55 It is worth
summarising Hepburn v Brown because I intend to refer to its facts again below.
Here, police officers from Strathclyde, acting on information from another police
force, obtained a warrant to search a house in Strathclyde. A member of the latter
police force was involved in the search and found drugs and associated
paraphernalia, immediately passing them to a colleague from Strathclyde. The
accused argued that that evidence should not be admitted because the warrant
was granted only to members of Strathclyde police force. The Sheriff thought
that the search was not irregular but added that, even if it were, there was no
unfairness to the accused and, following Lawrie, he would have excused the
irregularity.56
The Appeal Court, however, was very clear that the search was irregular but equally
convinced that the irregularity was one which could be excused under the Lawrie
formula and thus the Sheriff had been entitled to admit the evidence. In the
court’s opinion, the critical factors were that there was no element of trickery or
misrepresentation in gaining access to the premises, that the search would have
been carried out anyway, and that it might well have been the Strathclyde officers
who discovered the drugs.57 As we shall see, the fact that the search was in good
50 Ibid. at 301.
51 Ibid. at 313.
52 Lords Justice General Rodger, Allanbridge and Cowie each sat in two of the three cases.
53 1995 SLT 528.
54 1997 SLT 1241.
55 1997 JC 63.
56 Ibid. at 64–5.
57 Ibid. at 66.
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faith and would have taken place anyway has carried little weight with the Appeal
Court in various other cases.58
Thus, there have been very few cases where the Appeal Court has been prepared
either to approve the exercise by a trial judge of his capacity, under Lawrie, to
excuse an irregularity in the gathering of physical evidence or exercise this power
on its own account where the trial judge has mistakenly held that there was no
impropriety. It is perhaps worth mentioning that there are a few cases where, as
in Hepburn and McNeill, a trial judge has held that evidence was regularly obtained
but has gone on to state that, even if the conduct complained of did constitute an
irregularity, the trial court would have been prepared to excuse it. For instance,
in the early case of HMA v Hepper,59 Lord Guthrie concluded that the police were
entitled to remove a briefcase, containing the name and address of another person,
from the accused’s house while searching it in connection with another matter.
However, he also opined that even if the police were thought to be acting
irregularly, the evidence was nevertheless admissible ‘in view of the interest of
society in the detection of crime’.60 Similarly, in HMA v McKay, Lord Wheatley
held at trial that the seizure of various documents under a search warrant was
regular but added that, even if the search were irregular, he would have excused
the irregularity because there was no suggestion of an ‘unfair trick’ and there
was an element of urgency.61
In this context, it is also worth examining the rather odd events in the recent
case of McAnea and Others v HMA.62 In this case, the trial judge held that a warrant
was invalid and, consequently, that certain vital evidence was inadmissible. After
an overnight adjournment, requested by the prosecution to determine whether
and how to proceed, the prosecution argued that the irregularity should be
excused on the basis of Lawrie and the trial judge accepted that submission, thus
admitting the evidence. The accused were convicted but succeeded on appeal
because the High Court held that a trial judge was not free to reconsider and, if
appropriate, to alter a ruling on a defence objection. What is interesting about
the case is that it seems that it did not occur to the prosecution until the next
day to argue that even if there were an irregularity with regard to the warrant,
this should be excused under the Lawrie formula. The fact that this possibility
was not uppermost in the mind of the prosecution perhaps indicates the
58 For instance, Singh and Singh v HMA 2001 SCCR 348 which is discussed below.
59 1958 JC 39.
60 Ibid. at 40. This was one of the two conflicting cases upon which Gray, above n. 35, based his
critique of Lawrie.
61 1961 JC 47 at 50–1.
62 2000 SCCR 779. I am obliged to my colleague, James Chalmers, for a helpful discussion we had
about this case.
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infrequent use made of Lawrie by the courts to enable them to admit evidence
which was improperly obtained.
Avoidance techniques
An examination of judicial decisions in this area leaves one with an impression
that the courts are somewhat reluctant to embark on the balancing exercise
involved in the application of the Lawrie test. Instead, they often prefer to resolve
the issue of the admissibility of irregularly obtained real evidence through various
ploys before reaching this stage of the process. One common device has been to
reject the trial court’s view that a search was improper. This is usually done by
holding that the urgency of the situation or the technicality of the flaw in the
procedure means that the seizure of the evidence was not irregular. A case falling
into this category is Burke v Wilson where the Sheriff had excused an irregular
seizure of obscene videotapes but in the Appeal Court Lords Ross and Wylie held
that the seizure was regular, thus avoiding the need to determine whether it
should be excused.63 Another such case is Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 of 2002
which will be discussed below.64
Sometimes, this sort of practice can seem highly artificial, whether adopted by
the Appeal Court or the trial court. In Devlin v Normand,65 a prison officer suspected
that the accused, who was visiting a friend in prison, had something in her mouth.
He asked her if she did and she denied it. He then asked her to open her mouth
and she complied. The officer saw a package under her tongue and asked her to
hand it over, which she did. This contained cannabis. At her trial, the Sheriff
held that there was no irregularity, despite the fact that no caution had been
administered to the accused, and admitted the evidence. On appeal, the defence
argued that there had been an irregular search and, further, that this had not
been excused by the Sheriff. The Appeal Court neatly side-stepped the latter issue
by holding that there was no ‘search … within the proper meaning of that
expression’ because the accused had cooperated with the prison officer entirely
‘voluntarily’.66 It is thus fair to say that the decision hinged on a narrow definition
of the word ‘search’ and a wide definition of the word ‘voluntarily’. Further, as
Gordon pointed out in his commentary on the case, no reference is made to the
leading case of McGovern (see above) which suggests that consent given without a
63 1988 SCCR 363. Lord Dunpark, who gave the leading opinion, did not make it clear whether he
thought that evidence was properly seized or whether this was a situation where an irregularity
could be excused (at 367–8).
64 2002 SCCR 743. See also HMA v Foulis and Young 2002 SCCR 429 which is discussed below.
65 1992 SCCR 875.
66 Ibid. at 877.
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warning that it may be withheld is worthless.67 In any event, the way in which
the Appeal Court decided the case meant that the Lawrie test did not have to be
applied because there was no irregularity to be considered.68
In my view, the most questionable device adopted by the courts to avoid the need
to carry out the Lawrie-type balancing act is illustrated beautifully by the case of
Singh.69 Here the Crown had argued that a search was regular and the trial Sheriff
had agreed with this submission. On appeal the Crown conceded that the search
was irregular, and the Appeal Court expressed agreement with this view. The
latter then went on to observe: ‘In any event, standing the admitted irregularity,
it was for the Crown to excuse it … No attempt was made before the sheriff to do
so.’70 The Appeal Court thus concluded that the evidence was inadmissible. One
wonders just how the Crown could have been expected to argue before the Sheriff
that an irregularity was excusable when its position at the time was that there
was no irregularity and the Sheriff had already ruled in its favour. This decision
would appear to require the Crown in every case where the regularity of a search
is at issue, and perhaps even where it is not, to demonstrate, regardless of the
decision reached by the trial court, that any purely hypothetical irregularity which
might later be found by an Appeal Court was excusable in the circumstances.
This does not seem particularly sensible or logical.
The reluctance of the judiciary to apply the Lawrie test is rarely admitted but it
does come through in the recent case of Foulis and Young71 which involved a search
warrant dated ‘November 2000’ with no specification of any more precise date.
The Sheriff took the view that the resulting evidence was inadmissible because
there were certain basic formalities essential to the validity of a warrant. In his
view, to decide that this defect was potentially excusable would be to introduce
‘an element of uncertainty’ to the law should there be similar failures in the
future. In other words, he was not prepared to apply Lord Cooper’s test on the
ground, it seems, that the irregularity was too serious for it to be excused, although
his reasoning was not entirely clear. The Crown appealed and the Appeal Court,
without commenting on the Sheriff’s observations, simply held that the lack of a
67 Ibid.
68 See also Davidson v Brown 1990 SCCR 730 and Brown v Glen 1997 SCCR 636. In the latter case, the
Sheriff excluded evidence because the accused had not been told that he could refuse to comply
with the search but, following a prosecution appeal, the Appeal Court held that the search was
not irregular and distinguished the case from McGovern 1950 JC 33.
69 2001 SCCR 348. This case is further discussed below.
70 Ibid. at 358. The court cited Mowbray v Valentine 1991 SCCR 494 and Hepburn v Vannet 1997 SCCR
698 (also cited as Hepburn v Brown 1998 JC 63) to support its view. The latter case does not seem to
be a particularly good authority for this proposition because it is not at all clear from the report
that the court required the prosecution to demonstrate why the irregularity should be excused
(1998 JC 63 at 65A and 66A–C).
71 HMA v Foulis and Young 2002 SCCR 429.
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precise date did not render a common law warrant invalid and thus that there
was no irregularity at all. As we just saw, this is the approach the Appeal Court
adopted in Burke and Singh, rather than accept that there was an irregularity and
then apply the Lawrie test to determine whether it could be excused.72 Whether
intentionally or not, this decision had the effect of relieving the Appeal Court of
the task of applying Lord Cooper’s test and thus having to exercise its discretion
in weighing the public interest against fairness to the accused.
Returning to the Sheriff’s comments, however, it is worth observing, first, that
his fears of creating uncertainty were not particularly well founded because it is
not at all clear from the authorities in this area exactly what comprises an
‘irregularity’ in a warrant in the first place, thus a degree of uncertainty is
inevitable. The fact that the Sheriff thought the search warrant was irregular
and that the Appeal Court took a different view illustrates this point perfectly.
Secondly, the Sheriff had also observed that ‘it was an unattractive proposition’
that a court would have to engage in ‘an exercise of discretion’ to determine
whether an error made by another member of the judiciary was excusable.73 One
might respond that determining the regularity or otherwise of a search usually
involves reviewing an error by an actor within the criminal justice system, whether
that is a police officer, prosecutor, or judge. There seems no reason in principle
why the latter’s decision to grant a warrant in a particular form should be immune
from such a review.
Conflating the tests
Another factor, which has reduced the need of the courts to grapple with the
Lawrie test, has been a tendency to conflate the issues of (1) whether there was an
irregularity and, if so, (2) whether it can be excused. These two questions are, of
course, analytically separate but the courts do not always treat them accordingly
and, in such cases, the ratio for a decision can become rather confusing. A good
example of this occurs in Bell v Hogg,74 which I shall dissect at some length in
order to demonstrate my point. Here Bell and his co-accused were suspected of
the theft of copper wire and taken to a police station. Before they were arrested
or charged, they were asked by the police to provide rubbings from their hands
but were not told they were entitled to refuse to do so. At trial, objection was
taken to the leading of evidence that the hand-rubbings contained a substance
72 There are a few cases where, having concluded that the evidence was regularly obtained, the
court has gone on to state that even if it were not, the court would be prepared to excuse the
irregularity, e.g. Hepper v HMA 1958 JC 39.
73 HMA v Foulis and Young 2002 SCCR 429 at 430.
74 1967 JC 49.
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identical to that on the wire. The police sergeant involved stated that if he had
delayed the taking of the rubbings, the accused might have asked to use the
lavatory and washed their hands, and the Sheriff held that the urgency of the
situation ‘excus[ed] the admitted irregularity’75 of the sergeant’s actions. Thus,
the Sheriff seems to have been perfectly clear that there were two separate
questions to be addressed: whether there was an irregularity; and, if there were,
whether it could be excused.
On appeal, the Lord Justice General Clyde, who gave the leading opinion,
concluded that the evidence was admissible but his reasoning is not at all clear.
Initially, he appears to suggest that there was no irregularity, observing that the
police took a ‘perfectly proper and legitimate step’ in securing the evidence in
view of the urgency of the situation.76 That conforms to the pattern noted above—
of deciding that what the trial court thought was irregular was not irregular at
all. He went on, however, to distinguish the case from McGovern where it was
accepted that there was an irregularity, which was not excused because there
had been no element of urgency. Finally, Lord Clyde quoted with approval Lord
Wheatley’s recent dicta in Miln v Cullen77 (a confession case) about the need to
balance ‘fairness to the accused’ against ‘fairness to the public’.78 Thus, latterly,
he appears to depart from his earlier position that there was no irregularity by
implying that there was but that it could be excused. Thus, it is clear that Lord
Clyde thought that the urgency of the situation rendered the evidence admissible
but it is entirely unclear whether his view was that (a) there was no irregularity
because the police sergeant was ‘well entitled’79 to act as he did or (b) there was
an irregularity but that it could be excused under the Lawrie formula as reiterated
in Miln.
Lord Migdale was clear that there were two separate issues to be considered. In
his view, the Sheriff could have held that the sergeant acted properly but ‘[e]ven
if this is wrong’, he thought that the action of the police was ‘justified’ under the
test set out in Lawrie. However, he went on to observe that whether the sergeant’s
actions were proper or whether they required to be excused, ‘the question still
remains whether it was fair to the accused to allow this evidence to be used in
court’. In his opinion, this question was answered by ‘balancing the interests of
the appellants as individuals against the interest of the public, which requires
that guilty persons should be convicted’. Thus, Lord Migdale was clear that there
were two separate issues involved: (a) whether the evidence was obtained
75 Ibid. at 53.
76 Ibid. at 56.
77 Miln v Cullen 1967 JC 21.
78 Bell v Hogg 1967 JC 49 at 57. The phrases quoted are those of Lord Wheatley in Miln.
79 Ibid.
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irregularly and (b) if so, whether such irregularity could be excused—but implied
that the answers to both questions are determined by exactly the same test.80
Lord Cameron too seemed to conflate the two questions, starting by concluding
that the police action was ‘lawful and proper’ because there was no unfairness to
the accused, and concluding by justifying the police action under the Lawrie test
on the grounds of the urgency of the situation.81
The problem with conflating the two issues in this way is that the latter issue, i.e.
the question as to whether an irregularity can be excused, becomes superfluous
in most cases. It is difficult to see how a court could determine (a) that the police
did behave in an irregular manner but (b) that irregularity could be excused,
unless the two relevant factors—‘fairness to the accused’ and the ‘public interest’—
are given different weights at each stage of the process. This latter possibility has
never been suggested, of course. Put another way, whether one applies the Lawrie
test at the first or second analytical stage should make very little, if any, difference
to the final outcome. In practice, however, as we have seen, the courts have on
occasion held that evidence was improperly obtained but, nevertheless, that the
irregularity can be excused. Perhaps one reason for the apparent rarity of such
decisions, i.e. to excuse an irregularity, is the tendency to conflate the two tests
and apply similar criteria at each stage of the process, meaning that if there was
an impropriety on the part of the police, it is unlikely the irregularity can be
excused. It is important to note that this argument does not apply where the
alleged impropriety has been perpetrated by someone other than a police officer
because the courts are clearly not prepared to grant the same degree of latitude
to civilians in determining whether they have behaved irregularly. This perhaps
explains why so many of the cases in which the court has considered whether an
irregularity can be excused involve agencies other than the police.82
Similarly, in the more recent case of Edgley v Barbour,83 where the Appeal Court
upheld the decision of the Sheriff at trial to admit certain evidence seized by the
police, it is not at all clear, either from the Sheriff’s or Appeal Court’s judgment,
which was given by the Lord Justice General, whether (a) the urgency of the
situation meant that the police were entitled to act as they did and thus that
80 Ibid. at 59.
81 Ibid. at 60–1.
82 For instance, two of the original three cases: Lawrie itself; and Fairley. More recently, there have
been Singh and Devlin (also see above). If these were cases of alleged police irregularities, the
courts would have been more likely to hold that, in the circumstances, the police were acting
properly. As the Appeal Court noted in Lawrie, the courts are not prepared to construe the powers
of non-police agencies in quite such a generous fashion. See also the recent contrasting cases of
Wilson v Brown 1996 SLT 686 and Mackintosh v Stott 1999 SCCR 291, both of which involved the
seizure of drugs from accused by club doormen.
83 1994 SCCR 789.
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there was no irregularity or (b) there was an irregularity but it was excused by
the urgency of the circumstances.84 In this context, it is interesting to note that
the Appeal Court cited Bell v Hogg in the crucial part of its judgment, as well as
McGuigan, where the urgency of the situation meant the seizure of the evidence
was not irregular, and Lawrie, where the irregularity was excused.85 Another case
illustrating such judicial ambiguity is Burke v Wilson86 where Lord Dunpark, giving
the leading opinion in the Appeal Court, stated, on the one hand, that the search
warrant ‘entitled’ the police to remove suspicious videos, also observing that
this evidence was ‘lawfully removed’, but, on the other hand, then immediately
went on to state that as it is competent to charge persons on the basis of ‘irregularly
obtained’ evidence, and here he cited Fairley, the tapes could form the basis of
the prosecution case. Thus his reasoning is somewhat opaque.87
Further inconsistencies
As I think I have already demonstrated, the Scottish case law on the admissibility
of irregularly obtained real evidence is somewhat inconsistent and lacking any
coherent approach. Before drawing this piece to a conclusion, however, it is worth
highlighting a couple more instances of this problem. First, one can contrast the
recent cases of Hepburn88 and Singh,89 both of which were discussed above. In
Hepburn, it will be remembered that an unauthorised person—a police officer
from another force—took part in a search and actually discovered the evidence
before handing it to one of his authorised colleagues. The irregularity was excused,
essentially because there was no element of trickery and the search would have
taken place anyway.90 In Singh, a warrant authorised four customs officers to search
premises but eight officers attended (although the Crown attempted to claim
that only four conducted the search while the others interviewed the accused).
The irregularity was not excused although again there was no element of trickery
and the search would have taken place anyway, although perhaps if the
prosecution had actually advanced this argument the court might have been
84 Ibid. at 792–3.
85 It is fair to say that, having pointed out that in the former case it was decided that the search
was regular, the Appeal Court then cited Lord Aitchison’s dicta to the effect that an irregularity
does not always mean the evidence cannot be admitted (1994 SCCR 789 at 793). Overall, however,
the impression is one of some ambiguity about the court’s precise reasons for determining that
the evidence was properly admitted.
86 Burke v Wilson 1988 SCCR 361. This was discussed above.
87 The Sheriff was similarly ambiguous about his grounds for admitting the evidence (at 364) but
in the Appeal Court, the Lord Justice Clerk, in a supporting judgment, was perfectly clear that
the seizure was regular (1988 SCCR 361 at 368–9), an opinion with which the third judge, Lord
Wylie, simply concurred.
88 1998 JC 63.
89 2001 SCCR 348.
90 See also Namyslak 1995 SLT 528 where the court excused the irregularity essentially because it
made no difference in terms of outcome.
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more sympathetic to this point of view.91 It is clear, however, that in Singh the
Appeal Court thought it critical that there was no indication that the Singhs
knew, or could have known, of the restriction in the warrant, whereas its terms
ought to have been known to the customs officers.92 Yet, in Hepburn, there was
also no evidence to show that the accused knew or could have known of the
restriction in the warrant, whereas presumably its terms ought to have been
known to the police. Thus, one wonders how the Appeal Court could take such a
different attitude to the cases, particularly when one could argue that the offence
in Singh—large-scale and long-term VAT fraud—was more serious than the offence
in Hepburn—possession of a small amount of drugs.
The problems in this area can be further illustrated by the recent case of HMA v
Aspinall.93 Here the police searched the house of a suspected paedophiliac and
recovered a computer on which the accused had allegedly stored over 7,500
pornographic images of children. The warrant authorised police officers to
conduct the search but a civilian employee joined them in the later stages to
help to take away the computer. The Sheriff took the view that the search was
irregular and that he was not prepared to excuse the irregularity, thus he excluded
all the evidence acquired in the course of the search. The fact that the search was
taking place anyway appeared to carry little or no weight with the Sheriff, as in
Singh but in contrast to Hepburn.94 After this ruling, the prosecution led no
evidence, the civilian employee having been the first witness, and the accused
was acquitted which, quite understandably, caused an outcry in the press.95 This
led to a Lord Advocate’s reference (a form of appeal by the prosecution brought
to clarify the law), which resulted in the Appeal Court holding that the search
was not irregular because the civilian was not actively involved in the search and
was under the direction of a police officer at all times. This decision that the
evidence should have been admitted did not, of course, affect the accused’s
acquittal. The Appeal Court distinguished Hepburn, where the search was deemed
irregular, but did not explain how this situation could be distinguished from
Singh, where the search was also deemed irregular.
It is worth citing one further example of the morass of detail and inconsistency
in which the Appeal Court has got itself bogged down, largely as a result of the
91 It will be remembered that the appeal was decided on the point that the prosecution had made
no attempt to excuse the irregularity at trial, although at that time the Sheriff had decided the
search was not improper.
92 Singh and Singh v HMA 2001 SCCR 348 at 358.
93 This led to Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 of 2002—a form of prosecution appeal—2002 SCCR 743,
under which citation the case was reported. Further details of the trial can be obtained from a
long and critical feature of the law in the Sunday Herald, 18 November 2001.
94 1998 JC 63 at para. 10.
95 See Sunday Herald, 18 November 2001.
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approach taken to the Lawrie formula. This involves the situation where an
authorised search for evidence of one crime throws up evidence of another and
unconnected crime. We have already seen that Gray questions whether a
distinction really can be drawn between the first two cases on this point, Turnbull
and Hepper, in which Lord Guthrie came to different conclusions.96 This type of
judicial hair-splitting became even more imaginative in the subsequent case of
Drummond v HMA.97 Here two police officers searched the accused’s house for
property stolen from a furniture store. They opened a wardrobe and found stolen
garments which led to the accused being charged with theft by housebreaking
from entirely separate premises. At trial, the first officer stated that when the
wardrobe was opened he was looking for those latter items, hence the Sheriff
upheld an objection to his evidence on the basis that the search was irregular.
When the second officer subsequently gave evidence, he (unsurprisingly) stated
that at the relevant time he had been looking for some of the smaller items of
furniture referred to in the warrant, hence the Sheriff held his evidence about
finding the clothing admissible.
The Appeal Court agreed with the Sheriff that a deliberate attempt to search for
material beyond the scope of a warrant precluded the admission of that material
as evidence in a future prosecution for an unconnected crime but, as shown in
Hepper, if the police simply happened to come across such material, that did not
render it inadmissible as the product of an irregular search. Again, this appears
to be a very fine distinction, turning, as it does, on the precise state of mind of a
police officer at the time of the seizure of the evidence.98 In contrast to this
subjective approach to police intention, a mere six years later, in Houston v Carnegie
the Appeal Court held that in determining whether a police officer had
‘reasonable grounds’ for detaining and subsequently searching someone the test
was an ‘objective one’.99 Thus, where a senior officer had ‘applied [his] mind’ to
the matter and was suspicious of the accused, it did not matter that the junior
officer, who had possession of the same information, and who was instructed by
the senior officer to detain the accused, had not considered whether there were
‘reasonable grounds’ for suspicion. The Appeal Court’s earlier decision in
Drummond was not cited in this case.
96 See text above n. 37.
97 1993 SLT 476.
98 Brown observes, somewhat ironically I suspect, that this carries the significance of the individual
circumstances of the search ‘perhaps as far as it can get’: A. Brown, Criminal Evidence and Procedure,
2nd edn (Butterworths: Edinburgh, 2002) at 46.
99 1999 SCCR 604 at 608.
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Conclusion
The ground-breaking decision in Lawrie v Muir gave the Scottish courts an early
opportunity to exercise a power to exclude improperly obtained real evidence
where the infringement of the accused’s rights outweighed the public interest in
the evidence being placed before the courts. Unfortunately, the courts have failed
to develop a clear and principled framework for operating this power, instead
creating what sometimes seems to be a morass of incoherent and conflicting
decisions in individual cases. As described above, there are a number of reasons
for this. First and foremost, there is the lack of a clear rationale for excluding
irregularly obtained evidence—whether it be a ‘reliability’, ‘disciplinary’,
‘vindicatory’, or ‘moral legitimacy’ principle. As in other jurisdictions where
similar discretions have been introduced more recently, this has fatally hindered
the development of a coherent and consistent approach to the issue by the Scottish
courts. As we have seen, this was first noted by Gray and by JTC100 in the 1960s but
it remains equally true today. Another important reason for the lack of clarity in
the law has been the reluctance of the Appeal Court to concede a ‘discretion’ to
the trial judge, and a resulting series of Appeal Court judgments which
concentrate on the minutiae of the circumstances of particular cases rather than
on setting out simple, clear and consistent principles. The development of a
coherent legal framework has been further hindered by the tendency of the courts
to avoid if at all possible having to engage in the balancing act envisaged by Lord
Cooper in Lawrie.
Thus, despite over 50 years having elapsed since Lawrie, in Scotland we are in a
position where the leading text on evidence simply lists, without further
explanation, a series of factors which the courts may take into account in
determining whether to excuse an irregularity and admit improperly obtained
evidence.101 These include: the gravity of the crime; the seriousness of the
irregularity; the urgency of the investigation; the likelihood of the evidence
disappearing if not seized immediately (which is connected to the previous factor);
the authority of those obtaining the evidence; the good faith of the investigators;
and the question of fairness to the accused (whatever ‘fairness’ means in this
context). It is not at all clear from the jurisprudence why each factor is relevant,
nor in what circumstances it should be taken into account, nor what weight
should be given to it. On examining the relevant cases, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the decision whether to admit improperly obtained real evidence
is made by courts on the basis mainly of a ‘gut reaction’ which is then rationalised
100 See text following n. 35.
101 Ross, above n. 2 at 7.
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with whatever factor or factors from the list above best justifies the decision. As
yet, no principled, logical and coherent regime has emerged in Scotland to guide
the courts in the use of their power to admit or exclude irregularly obtained real
evidence and it is important that other jurisdictions should learn from this
experience which has now lasted for over 50 years.
